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Abstract 
Three decades of Turkish experience with nonselective industrial policies (consistent 
with neoliberal policy) clearly demonstrates that structural transformation in Turkish 
economy could not be achieved. In this paper, we have three motivations. Our first motivation 
is to discuss overall industrial policy developments in Turkey since 1980s. Secondly, we aim 
to recommend feasible selective  industrial policies for Turkey to support structural 
transformation. Thirdly, we comment on new Industrial Policy Strategy in Turkey. In that 
respect, our three basic research questions are, firstly, “is there still any meaningful space to 
implement industrial policy in developing countries such as Turkey?”, secondly, “which 
policies could be used?” and thirdly, “what are the main shortcomings of new Industrial 
Policy Strategy in Turkey?”. Our research demonstrates that there is still meaningful space to 
implement selective industrial policy in developing countries such as Turkey. Moreover, new 
Turkish Industrialization Strategy needs significant revisions if it genuinely aims at structural 
transformation in Turkey. 
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Resurgence of Selective Industrial Policy: What Turkey Needs 
“One powerful aspect of globalization is that those in developing countries can see 
the disparity between what is said and done in the North, and especially in the United 
States, and the policies which are recommended for, or imposed upon, them.” 
(Stiglitz, 2002, p.6) 
1.  Introduction 
In the 21
st century, changes in global business environment reinforced by advances in 
information and communication technologies, declines in transportation costs and 
modifications in international trade and investment rules yielded new challenges and 
opportunities for developing countries in their development paths.  
At a first glance, developing countries today seem as locked by a highly restricted 
policy space to design their autonomous industrial policies. They are confined with increasing 
importance of foreign direct investment (FDI), great concentration at the tier of the global 
value chains and World Trade Organization (WTO) constraints. But as discussed by Chang 
(2010), mobility of FDI and hence feasibility of autonomous economic policies hinge on the 
related industry and the country. Moreover industry concentrations are highly volatile in the 
long run and WTO rules are not fixed. They could be redesigned in favor of less developed 
countries with the cooperative and coordinated initiatives of fast growing emerging 
economies. 
 In this dynamic context, mainstream neoliberal practice/approach  is in support of 
laissez faire economics (free trade and free financial flows), which is regarded as capable of 
optimally allocating economic resources as necessary and sufficient condition for developing 
countries to industrialize, to prosper and to catch up with the developed world. This approach 
also asserts that, trusting free market economics (governments’ hands off approach), with 
improvements in information and communication technologies and declining transportation 
costs compared to past, will bear fruit earlier and enable poor countries to industrialize and to 
prosper more quickly.  
The unorthodox economists are skeptical about just trusting in alleged success of 
governments’ hands off approach to make developing countries industrialized and prosperous. 
They identify that, with a quick glance at the history of industrialized economies, today’s   3 
industrialized world did not get their high living standards by using free market apparatus. 
Conversely, the most loudly free market proponents in the world today, especially Great 
Britain and USA, have harnessed many interventionist industrial policies in the early and 
frequently in the later stages of their development (Shafaeddin, 1998; Chang and Grabel, 
2004, p. 10-11).  
Moreover,  we  can easily claim that the same advances in information and 
communication technologies and declining transportation costs plus trusting non-free market 
economics, usage of interventionist industrial policies, could also enable poor countries to 
industrialize and prosper faster today as can be seen by the experiences of China and India. 
Unorthodox development economists give significant importance to industrial policy 
to increase living standards in poor countries. In the broadest definition, industrial policy 
means policy that affects industry but it is not any policy that affects industry, in fact it is a 
selective industrial policy that is designed to prefer or favor particular industries over others 
(Shafaeddin, 2008; Chang and Grabel, 2004; Chang,  2010).  History of development 
economics demonstrates that properly implemented selective industrial policies, not 
(nonselective) neutral industrial policies, have succeeded in industrialization of many 
countries with very low industrial base (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Brazil etc.) 
and they have become again successful in transforming countries into developed ones (such as 
Great Britain, USA, Japan, Germany, France, Finland etc.).  
Again, readings from development economics,  history is highly instructive for 
developing country policymakers to recognize that Robert Walpole, the first British Prime 
Minister, is the first person who established infant industry program (could be read as 
industrial policy) in 1721, and he affected the first US Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Hamilton who first developed the theory of infant industry protection (Chang, 2010). So we 
can easily conclude that Great Britain and  US are both intellectual homes and first 
practitioners of industrial policies to develop their economies in history.  
By coming about two centuries forward since implementation of industrial policies in 
Great Britain and US, we see the increasing importance of development topic after World 
War II. In those years, development was considered as synonymous with industrialization as a 
result of intellectual and geopolitical environment (Structuralism, Big Push Model, 
dominance and ascendancy of Keynesian Thought and split of world economy into two   4 
blocs). Two related forces also boosted industrialization supporting environment. On the one 
hand, the western world faced up with rebuilding Europe, on the other hand newly 
independent countries aimed to change their economic structure with a more significant role 
of industry compared to traditional sectors (Rapley, Chp.2). Hence, during the interventionist 
era of 1950-1980, many countries have effectively and intensively implemented industrial 
policies as a part of their development programs. 
Turkish Republic has also aimed to industrialize since its establishment in 1923. As 
discussed by Şenses (1994), Turkish governments till 1980 put special emphasis on industrial 
policies to get rapid growth and industrialization. Şenses (1994) argues that, except for the 
1950-1953 and 1970-1973 periods, Turkish industrial policies in the period of 1923-1980 can 
be described as import substituting industrialization (ISI) with heavy protection. This ISI 
period has been ended with 1980 Structural Adjustment Program. The program has aimed 
export-oriented industrialization. Şenses (1994) claims that ISI in the period of 1965-1980 
aimed to upgrade industrial productive capacity from light consumer goods to consumer, 
intermediate and capital goods respectively, and it enabled to get a large and diversified 
Turkish industrial base. Moreover, that increase in industrial capacity was basically relied on 
growth of domestic demand. In the last years of 1970s, ISI led industrialization was faced 
with some bottlenecks and it was ended because of highly inefficient industrial structure, 
mainly rooted from long term extensive protection, distorted relative factor prices along with 
low employment generation, ignoring resource constraint on industrialization and carrying out 
populist policies in case of external shocks (Şenses, 1994).   
Our paper has three motivations. Our first motivation is to discuss overall industrial 
policy developments in Turkey especially in the neoliberal period (about last three decades). 
Secondly, we aim to propose  feasible  selective  industrial policies for Turkey to support 
structural transformation in the economy. Our suggestions will be consistent with restricted 
policy space that stems from increasing importance of FDI; great concentration at the tier of 
the global value chains and WTO related constraints. Thirdly, we comment on recently 
announced Industrial Policy Strategy in Turkey.  
Our three motivations are connected. Firstly, we identify unsatisfactory results of last 
three decades Turkish industrialization policies. We  think that our  experience  with 
nonselective industrial policies clearly demonstrates that the need for upgrading of Turkish 
productive structure continues. In other words, nonselective industrial policies have not made   5 
Turkey an industrialized country.  Secondly, we highlight proven success of selective 
industrial policies. Those well-designed industrial policies have enabled industrialization of 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Comparing those countries with Turkey makes clear 
that  Turkey  needs  well designed selective industrial policies to upgrade its productive 
structure. But, unfortunately, recently announced Industrial Policy Strategy does not offer 
satisfactory selective industrial policies although a literature survey demonstrates there is still 
space to implement selective industrial policy.  Moreover,  the strategy  has some serious 
shortcomings.  
In that respect, three basic research questions gain prominence: 
Is there still any meaningful space to implement industrial policy in less developed 
countries such as Turkey? 
Which policies can be used to support industrialization in Turkey? 
What are the main shortcomings of recently announced Industrial Policy Strategy in 
Turkey? 
To do so, in the next section, a literature survey on industrialization and industrial 
policy will be presented.  The  third section will present historical industrial policy 
developments in Turkey. In the fourth section, we will start to answer our research questions. 
In that respect, we will mention about space for industrial policy in less developed countries, 
policy recommendations and our discussions on recently announced Turkish Industrial 
Strategy respectively. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Literature Survey  
Economic development goes along with structural transformation that aims to increase 
the share of high productivity activities in the economy. Therefore, economic development 
policies are key to enrich people; increase aggregate saving that will be used to enhance 
capital accumulation of the economy. It should be admitted that high productivity activities 
could also include modern (nontraditional) agricultural activity as well as industry. In that 
respect, both of the sectors could be used to exploit high productivity gains. But it is known 
that welfare enhancing equitable economic growth occurs frequently in industrial activities. In 
the words of UNCTAD (2010):    6 
“the importance of manufacturing for economic development relates, on the supply 
side, to its potential for strong productivity growth, and on the demand side, to the high 
income elasticity of demand for manufactures. The productivity growth potential in 
manufacturing activities derives from their growing tendency towards specialization, learning 
and agglomeration economies, as well as from static and dynamic economies of scale. As 
labour and capital move into these activities, average productivity in the economy climbs. 
This further enhances the demand for services and industrial products, which generates 
profitable new investment opportunities in these areas and growing demand for labour.”  
In that respect, implementation of selective industrial policies to increase living 
standards becomes highly crucial. As discussed by Dicaprio and Gallagher (2006), belief 
about an economy that is based on manufacturing could yield productivity gains, stable export 
prices and more accessible externalities is the main motivation  for implementation of 
industrial policies. 
Although theoretical justification of need for industrial policy is clear, there are some 
skeptics. Due to Stiglitz (2002), negative attitude against industrial policy stems from naïve 
reading of economic theory and a misreading of economic history. He discusses that 
mainstream economic view of efficient competitive markets relies on unrealistic assumptions, 
even in most developed market economies, such as perfect information (nonexistence of 
asymmetric information) and complete markets (it is possible to get insurance for all risks in 
capital markets). Hence those unrealistic assumptions entail government intervention in 
market economies. He gives convincing reasons for the importance of selective industrial 
policies by discussing government originated innovations such as telegraph, the modern 
internet, high productive agricultural techniques in the United States and successful industrial 
policies enabled to close not just in capital but also a gap in knowledge in East Asian 
countries. 
Some important stylized facts of development are neatly explained by Rodrik (2006): 
Economic development entails product diversification; fast growing countries have large 
manufacturing capacity; long term economic booms go along with structural transformation 
that support manufacturing; both economic policy and factor endowments determine 
production structure, in other words successful industrializers have always searched dynamic 
comparative advantage, have not simply confined themselves to static comparative advantage; 
economies that aim to export more sophisticated goods grow faster than the ones not aiming   7 
at  industrial upgrading; there exists unconditional convergence at the level of individual 
products; and manufacturing specialization is more convenient to promote industrial 
upgrading. Rodrik (2006) does not accept the  neoliberal view that  getting economic 
fundamentals (macroeconomic stability and well functioning markets) right  ensures structural 
transformation and industrial development  and  asserts that industrial development entails 
robust industrial policy aimed at new exportables and a supportive exchange rate policy that 
advances production of tradables. Rodrik (2006) also warns inflation targeting countries by 
discussing  inflation  targeting monetary regimes have so far been  evaluated in terms of 
consequences for inflation and output volatility but not in terms of long-term growth.  
Productivity is the main driver of a country’s welfare and main determinant of catch 
up with more advanced countries (Haque, 2007). Hence differing productivity levels and 
growth rates among sectors imply that the catching up dynamics of an economy depends on in 
which sectors the economy could produce competitively. In that respect, importance of 
selective  industrial policy becomes evident in the way of getting maximum benefit from 
scarce resources by directing them to most efficient usage areas to support development. 
Haque (2007) also thinks that authority of governments in designing industrial and trade 
policy has been transferred not to free markets but to global firms owned by rich countries. 
These firms’ goals and strategies determine international trade, investment and service flows; 
they also affect economic policymaking in both home and host countries.  
Moreover global trade patterns may limit export capability of domestic young firms 
since being a part of a trade network of a global firm seems at least as important as producing 
competitively (Haque, 2007). In other words, just producing efficiently in domestic market 
could not be sufficient for new firms to enter world markets. But achieving to be one of the 
competitive suppliers of a global firm may not be welfare enhancing and could result in “a 
race to the bottom” with the nicely packaged slogan of export led growth. In sum, being a 
competitive supplier of a global firm may not be welfare enhancing, and it could not help 
developmental objectives of a less developed country.  
Shafaeddin (2008) argues that the need for trade and industrial policies depend on 
what poor countries want to do with trade liberalization. The paper claims that if the ultimate 
aim of trade liberalization (integration into the world economic system) is to prosper, then 
increasing necessity of tailor made trade and selective industrial policy becomes evident when 
concentration of international markets, increasing importance of global firms in production,   8 
trade flows and technology, acceleration of technological changes and more knowledge nature 
of production are taken into consideration. Shafaeddin (2008) argues that current international 
rules and attributes of the world economy support globalization but they are not favorable for 
poor countries to achieve developmental goals.   
3.  A Brief History of Industrial Policy in Turkey 
The Turkish Republic has put significant efforts to enhance its industrial base since its 
establishment in 1923. The main heritage from the Ottoman Empire was a huge external debt 
stock and capital shortage along with low human capital and labor force were big obstacles in 
front of industrialization. Because of destructive wars, which continued for many decades 
through the end of the Empire, basic skills and craftsmanship to trigger growth cycle were 
also  missing.  Initial conditions were highly unfavorable;  industrial base was almost non-
existent and agriculture dominated economic structure. In such a discouraging state, there was 
an experiment with private sector led development until about 1929-1930. The public sector 
tried to lead industrial development with the expiration of the restrictive clauses of the 
Lausanne Treaty in 1929
1, which imposed free trade regime on the Turkish economy, and 
significant industrial base has been settled as of 1950s with great efforts.  These 
industrialization endeavors continued in 1960s-1970s with the establishment of State 
Planning Organization (1960) and implementation of development plans. In the last years of 
1970s, foreign currency shortage and increasing political tension were instrumental in 
bringing industrialization attempts virtually to a halt. Turkey adopted neoliberal policies in 
close collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF at the beginning of 1980.  
This new (neoliberal) economic experiment continued  with  the  capital  account 
liberalization in 1989. Şenses (1994) argues that industrialization endeavors, which have been 
pursued by all governments until 1980, have been largely ignored as of implementation of 
structural adjustment program. According to Şenses (1994), the program has envisaged the 
retreat of state from manufacturing activity, supported privatization, aimed retrenchment in 
public investment program and directed government expenditures to transport, energy and 
communications instead of manufacturing investment. He also argues that excessively liberal 
and nondiscriminatory nature of FDI policy and significant weakening of the State Planning 
                                                 
1 The convention of Balta Liman in 1838 restricted tariff autonomy in Ottoman Empire and Turkey had to wait nearly a 
century to dissolve “unequal treaty” and to implement tariff policy independently in 1929. The nonexistence  of tariff 
autonomy in such a large empire and for such a long period make easy to grasp low industrial capacity inherited by the 
Turkish Republic.   9 
Organization under the neoliberal experiment were among other examples of the neglect of 
industrialization.  
Kepenek (1989) argues that industrialization endeavors in Turkey can be classified 
into two groups as ISI strategy in pre-1980 and export led growth strategy in post-1980 and 
although in the first period industrialization was aimed; in the second period industrialization 
has not been effectively pursued.  
According to Türel (2007), Turkish industrial policy in the period of 1960-1970 and in 
post-1980 period has not included well designed performance criteria to judge effectiveness 
of implemented policies. Moreover, instead of selective industrial polices  nonselective 
(neutral) ones have been used extensively in the post-1980 period.  
As this short discussion on industrial policy in Turkey demonstrates, post-1980 
economic policies were not prioritized in such a way to give sufficient consideration for long-
term prosperity enhancing objectives of investment, sustainable, stable and equitable growth, 
employment, income distribution and industrialization (Şenses and Taymaz, 2003 and Türel, 
2007). For about three decades, Turkey seems to have ignored fundamental developmental 
issues and was instead locked in and captured by a short-termist vision of financial markets.  
There are some recent signs that some industrial policy related issues are resurfacing 
in both academic and policy-making circles. Before evaluating the newly announced Turkish 
Industrial Strategy of January 5, 2011 which arguably is the most significant step in this 
direction, declining industrial policy space and policy recommendations will be discussed in 
the next section.  
4.  Some Discussions on Turkish Industrial Policy: Space, Recommendations 
and Shortcomings 
In  this  section of the paper, we will first  discuss industrial policy space in less 
developed countries like Turkey. This will be followed by our selective industrial policy 
recommendations and our discussions on the recently announced Turkish Industrial Strategy.  
   10 
a.  Is there still any meaningful space to implement industrial policy in 
developing countries such as Turkey? 
Both stylized facts of development discussed in Section two and history of 
development economics highlight importance of implementation of determined selective 
industrial policy for sustained growth and development. Although industrial policy is of 
crucial importance for the latter objective, policy space of developing countries has been 
narrowed considerably in recent years.  
According to Chang (2005), decay in policy space started in the 1980s with increasing 
practice of Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF and the World Bank and then 
continued with conditions attached to financial assistance policies of developed countries. 
Chang (2005) argues that decline in room for policy space has covered also topics of 
multilateral trade politics such as patents (TRIPs), regulation of foreign investment (TRIMs) 
trade in services (GATS) with the establishment of WTO in 1995. The paper also argues that 
developed countries try to impose restrictions on policy space of developing countries by 
using free trade and bilateral investment agreements. Chang (2005) discusses threat of capital 
flight, obsessive free market ideologues
2 and domestic interest groups in developing countries 
as other influential factors that squeeze industrial policy space.  
Although room for implementing industrial policy has declined, there is still space for 
implementing it in the WTO (Amsden, 2005). Historical evaluations demonstrate that policy 
space to implement industrial policy is not the smallest by historical standards (Chang, 2005). 
In that respect, the issue becomes what could be done to support development and how 
industrial policy should be implemented to yield most welfare enhancing results in developing 
countries. In other words, the issue is how less developed countries with limited industrial 
capacity move into more sophisticated and higher technology industries when mainstream 
economic view and international financial institutions with a leading role of WTO reduces 
space for infant industry protection and subsidization. 
The WTO enables member countries to protect themselves from competition from 
aggregate imports that yield significant trade deficits and from the competition that threaten 
their individual industries (Amsden, 2005). Under the GATT regime, countries could use 
                                                 
2 In the words of Chang (2005, p.6) “These days many economists in developing countries are ideologically committed to 
free market and want the policy space of their governments to be restricted lest that their policies deviate from (what they 
think are) what the “science” of economic says.”   11 
these measures to protect their industry without any time limit, but according to WTO rules, 
member countries can implement these measures for a limited period of eight years. She 
argues that there exists flexibility on application of WTO law by discussing non-existence of 
any action against free trade arrangements in Mexico. In Mexico, tariffs were increased 
significantly in 1995 with the argument of import threat. Amsden also argues usage of anti-
dumping duties could be considered when competitors sell their products below their costs. 
Moreover, as a result of limited agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), 
developing countries could harness local content requirements, trade balancing requirements 
and export requirements on firms in export processing zones to promote exports. In the words 
of Amsden (2005, p.220) “Thus, safeguards of various sorts enable countries to buttress their 
balance of payments and sustain an industry under siege. Safeguards can also be used to 
protect an infant industry, with eight years of protectionism virtually guaranteed.” She 
explains that subsidies for research and development, regional development and environment 
are not restricted by current WTO rules and these types of subsidies will continue to be 
operational since they have been used extensively in the United States and Europe. She also 
draws our attention to the importance of establishing proper reciprocal control mechanism and 
monitorable performance standards in allocating subsidies. She argues that industrial 
development efforts with control mechanism inclusive of science and technology subsidies 
yield fertile ground for less developed countries to industrialize.  
Stiglitz (2002) thinks that industrial policy, with a private and public consensus on 
vision of economic development, could play a  significant role in cases of coordination 
failures, large spillovers and significant problems of appropriability. He states that capital 
markets, with extensive asymmetric information problems especially for small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs), require state intervention. In addition, state interventions in 
education and in research and development could be used as a tool to direct human capital 
formation and knowledge generating capacity of the economy into desired competitiveness 
enhancing levels. Undertaking complementary infrastructure investments also calls for state 
involvement. Stiglitz also suggests the use of tax policies, special tax treatment of real estate 
and energy to limit speculative real estate and encourage energy efficient technologies 
respectively, as a form of industrial policy. In addition to satisfying financing needs of SMEs, 
he also supports establishment of industrial and research parks and incubators and venture 
capital firms and argues that industrial policy should not ignore rural sector to reduce poverty 
and ensure social stability and justice.   12 
Dicaprio and Gallagher (2006) analyze industrialization efforts of Newly 
Industrialized Countries in GATT and WTO regimes. They argue that although the WTO 
regime has narrowed the policy space of developing countries; there still exist policy options 
such as subsidies for R&D. 
Rodrik (2008) discusses the controversy surrounding two views about design of 
industrial policy. One is the traditional model in which the state determines the sectors that 
deserve  support and provides  incentives  for their growth while the second one considers 
industrial policy as a process that focuses on optimal institutional framework. He discusses 
how optimal industrial policy and its institutions could be designed by considering relevant 
market failures in the form of informational and political issues. He emphasizes  three 
principles that should be considered in design of the policy as embeddedness, carrot and sticks 
and accountability.  
Rodrik (2008) argues that uncertainty in the part of industrial policy makers about 
selection of support deserving sectors, intervention instruments and appropriate structure of 
cooperation and coordination mechanism among the state and the private sector requires an 
information flow from the private sector to the government. Hence, industrial policy should 
be designed as being aware of its information limitations and should function as a system of 
discovery. It should be embedded in private sector networks and bind the state to the society 
to extract required information to implement industrial policy as needed. Instead of just being 
autonomous, industrial policy should be based on “embedded autonomy”. The author also 
discusses that it should have well balanced structure in the form of incentives to encourage 
investments in non-traditional areas (the carrot) and discipline tools (the stick)  to  pick 
unsuccessful investments. Scarce resources should be used as efficiently as possible and some 
performance benchmarks should be set right at the outset. Rodrik further argues that design of 
industrial policy should also ensure accountability of policymakers to avoid corruption and 
enhance its legitimacy and to achieve that, a senior political profile could be held responsible 
for proper implementation of industrial policy, explicit goals could be given to individual 
agencies by holding them responsible to reach predetermined targets and transparency in the 
whole decision making processes could be increased. 
 Rodrik (2008) demonstrates that an industrial policy approach, which is aware of the 
potential problems in the design and implementation of industrial policy is possible  and 
argues that those potential problems of information and rent seeking are not fixed; they could   13 
be formed and made less binding. He also shows that, in different parts of economic policy 
making bodies of the state such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, or development banking, it 
could be already possible to design institutional arrangements that achieve social objectives 
by controlling informational and agency related problems.    
Haque (2007) draws our attention to negative effects of bilateral trade agreements 
between industrial and developing countries on development and upgrading of productive 
structure in the latter. He supports usage of “competition policy” with a wider perspective that 
detects unfair practices of foreign firms on domestic ones. He argues that certain privileges of 
foreign firms (such as access to finance, advertising, political influence, hostile takeovers etc.) 
may hamper domestic firms’ capital accumulation endeavors. Hence, the  low level of 
industrial activity in less developed country and being aware of harmful effects of global 
firms on domestic firms require more proactive competition policy in developing countries 
with  greater emphasis on national interest
3 as in the case of industrialized countries. 
Rodrik (2009) argues that structural change in an economy could retard and modern 
tradable sectors in developing countries could not thrive as expected as a result of sector 
specific problems related to access to finance and low sectoral private returns despite the 
existence of high social returns. The paper argues that developing countries suffer from both 
poor finance and poor returns curse and industrial policy could be used to fight against them 
by determining their strategic prioritization.  
Shafaeddin (2008) argues that although a state can support infant industries mainly 
two ways by aiming at an economy with full of externalities (via investment in education, 
training, infrastructure etc.) and collective efficiencies (via industrial districts, clustering etc.) 
and by providing specific support to nascent industries, getting a mature industry entails more 
of the latter in the form of subsidies or tariff protections. He thinks that for less developed 
countries, just trusting foreign direct investment to enter global market could result in 
unfruitful specialization pattern that is based on static comparative cost advantage of relevant 
country. The author argues, even with WTO restrictions, there are some policy tools such as 
usage of subsidies for R&D activities, subsidies for agriculture, harnessing assistance to a 
                                                 
3 One should recall discussions on the takeover bid of American PepsiCo (one of the leading manufactures of carbonated and 
non-carbonated beverages, snacks and other foods) for the French dairy group of Danone in mid-2005. Reaction of French 
Government was noteworthy: French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said after the cabinet meeting “We plan to 
defend France's interests and defend Danone as a national treasure”, French government prepared a law to protect companies 
in “strategic industries” such as Danone from takeover. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupe_Danone) 
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country’s disadvantaged regions
4, and subsidies for more environment friendly investments. 
The paper also mentions the  possibility of relocating selected  export industries in 
disadvantaged regions and nurture them with non-specific subsidies that are relevant for all 
industries in those regions.  
The discussion so far clearly demonstrates that there is still some meaningful space to 
implement  selective  industrial policy in less developed countries such as Turkey. Which 
specific policies could be implemented will be discussed in the next section. 
b.  Policy Recommendations  
In Turkey, industrialization and developmental issues should have high priority on the 
economic agenda. All economic policies should be designed by considering prioritized 
developmental perspective. To do so, conventional economics paradigm, in the words of 
Stiglitz (2002) “the policies focusing on liberalization, privatization and stabilization which 
collectively have come to be called the Washington consensus policies”, among bureaucracy 
should be challenged by putting strong theoretical arguments in favor of failures of neoliberal 
policies implemented in last three decades.  
In other words, as discussed by (Chang and Grabel, 2004) “there is no alternative to 
mainstream view” argument should be challenged, and awareness about alternative policies 
should be enhanced especially in the Turkish bureaucracy and academia. Although, how this 
could be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper, initially, curriculums of high school and 
university can be adjusted to include more compulsory developmental courses that discuss 
development experiences of industrialized countries. Moreover, getting closer relationships 
with other (more developmental vision bearing) institutions such as UNCTAD and UN etc. 
could be used to enrich developmental perspective in Turkish policy-making institutions. 
After reaching a consensus on “need for industrialization” and on “there is alternative 
to mainstream view”, other countries’ experiences could be utilized. Although, there is not 
one best industrial policy framework for all countries with different economic, cultural, social 
and political backgrounds, examining industrial policies in late industrializers (East Asian 
countries) could enable us to see and to integrate main determinants of industrial policy 
                                                 
4 According to Shafaeddin (2008, p.13) “The criteria should be based on development indicators, which should at least cover 
a measure of income or employment. Accordingly, the income per capita of the region should be lower than 85 per cent of 
the average for the country. The unemployment rate should be at least 110 per cent of the country average.”   15 
successes into Turkish industrial strategy. These main determinants can be classified as five 
issues (Chang, 2006).  
Firstly, it is quiet important to determine realistically which sectors will be selected by 
considering country’s technological capabilities and world market conditions. At the 
beginning, policymakers behave proactively and they should be aware of need to redesign 
goals and the forms of industrial policy as the economy reaches some predetermined 
technological capability and predetermined transformation of productive structure. In a 
retrospective manner, we observe that East Asian countries have promoted industries with 
high growth potential and widespread externalities. 
Secondly, it is important to link industrial policy with export strategy. By doing so, the 
economy reaches scale economies earlier, gets export revenue to import foreign technology to 
internalize and export performance could be used to judge performance criteria for promoted 
industries.  
Thirdly, the state should discipline promoted industries and limited resources should 
be used as efficiently as possible. Rodrik (2008) also discusses that industrial policy should 
have well balanced  structure in the form of incentives to encourage investments in non-
traditional areas and discipline tools to pick unsuccessful investments (carrot and stick 
approach). 
Fourthly, competent bureaucracy and its autonomy from pressures of different 
segments of society are also important to implement industrial policy properly. But it should 
be kept in mind that nonexistence of qualified bureaucracy initially  does not necessarily 
hinder countries to implement industrial policy properly and quality of bureaucracy could be 
improved with purposeful efforts as in the case of Korea. 
Fifthly, there should be high level of coordination and cooperation between the state 
and the private sector. This relation should be in the form of “embedded autonomy” in which 
the state has roots in society and it has its own will and autonomy to implement industrial 
policy properly (Chang, 2006; Rodrik, 2008).  
Kepenek (1989) argues that Turkey needs an industrialization policy based on 
domestically produced technology and claims that an industrial policy should be evaluated not 
just focusing on economic criteria such as employment generation, foreign currency earnings   16 
etc. but also caring on to what extent it supports improvement of human capital quality. He 
asserts that main determinant of industrialization is technology and hence technology should 
be real criteria to judge industrial policy.  
Current development literature also supports Kepenek (1989) and it informs us that 
development level of any society is determined by what they produce and how they produce. 
This understanding makes an economy’s production technology an important determinant of 
the level of sophistication in using production factors. Hence, the real difference between 
developed and less developed countries is technology-producing ability, the former group of 
countries has capability to generate new technology, and technology performs as a new way 
of capital accumulation by determining level of surplus over production costs. Moreover, 
technology may enable high skilled labor-intensive production, increasing productivity, 
growing real incomes and improving social welfare (Kepenek, 1989; Chang, 2009).  
In that framework, we think that Turkey should aim at the production of new domestic 
technology and innovation in selected sectors. Those sectors should be ones with high 
externality disseminating and high growth potential industries, and policymakers should have 
a long-term perspective of gradually having global domestic players in the selected sectors.  
Presenting favorable working conditions to limit brain drain from sectors and improving the 
sectors related quality of science and technology education should also support this endeavor. 
But, while pursuing these objectives, industrial policy design should include three traits of 
“embedded autonomy”, “carrot and stick” structure and “accountability of policymakers” 
(Rodrik, 2008). Moreover well-designed deliberation council should include  all relevant 
socio-economic actors in the society. For Turkey as a less developed country,  industrial 
development efforts with “control mechanism inclusive” science and technology subsidies 
can yield fertile ground to industrialize (Amsden, 2005).  
  As discussed in the earlier sections, there is still useful policy space to implement 
selective industrial policy. What Turkey can do in its policy space and which industrial policy 
actions could be utilized along with subsidization of production of new domestic technology 
and innovation in selected sectors will be argued in the next paragraphs
5. 
We think that, Turkey should try to use emergency tariff increases by considering its 
long term developmental goals. It should aim to nurture selected sectors (and hence firms) by 
                                                 
5 A more specific and detailed discussion can be found in Şenses and Taymaz (2003).   17 
utilizing emergency tariff increases. Surely, it has to envisage convincing arguments to do so. 
We think that Turkey with a chronic trade deficit and large domestic market could easily 
convince its trading partners. Hence, a policy space to nurture selected industries for eight 
years could be obtained by invoking sectoral jumps in imports or overall balance of payments 
problem.  
In addition, Turkey should try to perform a decisive role in WTO negotiations to resist 
decision taken against its development goals, to put pressure on main WTO decision makers 
to get benefit, and it should try to be more active to keep interests of less developed countries 
in multilateral organizations by cooperating and coordinating with other significant 
developing countries. For instance, Turkey and other countries should strongly resist 
international  division of labor proposals that imply “industry-agriculture swap” among 
developed and less developed countries as discussed at the Doha Round (Chang, 2009) and 
should try to nurture selected sectors as much as possible.  
Subsidies for agriculture, regional development, basic research and development, 
environment related technology upgrading is allowed (Chang, 2010) within current industrial 
policy domain. In that respect, Turkey should aim to focus on the most social benefit yielding 
usage of those allowed “domestic” subsidies when they are still permitted.  
Moreover, in addition to domestic production of technology in selected sectors, 
agriculture and animal husbandry should also be treated strategically. These sectors are still 
vital for Turkey because of its roles in preventing deruralization and alleviating social tension 
in rural and urban.  Furthermore,  these sectors could affect other manufacturing sectors 
positively. For instance, organic output of agriculture (such as organic cotton) could be used 
in higher value added inclusive textile and clothing products. In other words, all industrial 
policy strategy, not just agriculture-related ones, should be designed by considering backward 
and forward linkages in the economy. 
Chang (2010, p.34) also discusses that “countries can still impose conditions regarding 
the hiring of local labor (a good way to create technological spillover effects), technology 
transfer, and the conduct of R&D. They can also provide targeted subsidies, directed credits, 
and tailor-made infrastructure (measures that Singapore and Ireland have used, to attract FDI 
into “targeted” industries).” These purposeful, deliberately-guided FDI policies should also be 
relevant for Turkey. Turkey with large and unsaturated domestic market seems to attract   18 
significant amount of foreign direct investment, and it should use its desirable characteristics 
to bargain with multinational companies to exploit them in a manner that is consistent with its 
long-term developmental perspective.  
  In addition, WTO rules do not hinder government policies that aim to reduce regional 
disequilibria and Turkey should promote sufficiently selected industries to convince them to 
relocate their production facilities into less developed regions in the country. For instance, 
Turkey can implement “flying geese pattern” of East and South-East Asian industrial 
development by utilizing state incentives. In this framework, infant industries are located in 
less developed regions of the country and they get considerable “nonactionable” state 
subsidies to grow up and after reaching sufficient competitiveness level they are replaced with 
another “infant” industry (or selected firms). We think that, selecting specific infant firms 
could be less eye catching (nonactionable), and by doing so the state could support occurrence 
of global firms. 
  We also think that, in addition to exports, Turkey has also potential to upgrade its 
productive structure by relying on its large and unsaturated domestic market. In that respect, 
any industrial policy should also consider possibility of productivity driven domestic led 
growth. Such a perspective could eliminate risk of “race to bottom” and “political pressures” 
that could exist in export led growth strategy (Unctad, 2010).  
Competition policy could be used more effectively in Turkey with a wider perspective 
that detects unfair practices of foreign firms on domestic ones. As it is known, foreign firms 
have certain special privileges and they may hinder domestic firms’ growing up efforts. 
Hence, immature industrial capacity in developing country and being aware of inimical 
effects of global firms on domestic firms require proactive competition policy in developing 
countries with increased emphasis on national interest. 
With regards to monetary and exchange rate policy, industrial development and 
measures directed at  export structure upgrading should also get benefit from a more 
supportive exchange rate policy. As far as we know, there is no country which  could 
industrialize with an overvalued domestic currency. Declining developmental policy space 
increases importance of appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies. We think that, 
although there are some important structural factors that determine export and trade balance 
developments (Aydın, Saygılı, Saygılı and Yılmaz, 2010; Saygılı, Cihan, Yalçın and Hamsici,   19 
2010) in Turkey, real effective exchange rates are also important in competitiveness and 
hence export performance of Turkish exporters (Yılmaz, 2009; Gönenç and Yılmaz, 2007; 
Yılmaz and Gönenç, 2008). In sum, policymakers should not ignore developments in real 
effective exchange rates. 
Last but not least, transformation of Turkish productive structure may even need to 
change valid policy space limiting factors. In that respect, we believe that, Turkey should be 
ready to consider enlarging “declining” industrial policy space by revising Customs Union 
(CU) related constraints on Turkish industrial policy design. If Turkey’s full EU membership 
will not be ensured in a foreseeable future, Turkey should envisage significant changes in CU 
agreement to have full rights to design its industrialization policy. Current CU structure is 
unfair, its unfairness can be neatly summarized by the words of Chang (2005, p.14) “needless 
to say, level playing field is the right principle to adopt when the players are equal. However, 
when the players are unequal, it is the wrong principle to apply. For example, if a team of 13-
year-old children are playing football against the Brazilian national team, it is only fair that 
the playing field is not level and that children are allowed to attack from up the hill.” 
c.  Shortcomings of Newly Announced Turkish Industrial Strategy 
Turkish Ministry of Industry and Trade has published a new “Turkish Industrial 
Strategy
6” document on January 5, 2011. Although, it is nice to see gaining importance of 
discussions about industrialization along with endeavors to make industrialization strategy a 
hot topic, we think that there are some shortcomings in the document. These shortcomings are 
related to preparation process of the document, participants in deliberation council, and policy 
suggestions in the document. Unfortunately, those factors can limit or hinder success of the 
strategy.  
With regards to preparation of the document, we think that nonparticipation of labor 
side
7  in strategy preparation process decreases social adoption of the strategy and could 
inhibit reaching a consensus among different socio-economic actors. The current publicized 
document does not include views and demands of labor unions. In that respect, the designed 
industrial policy does not seem “embedded” as discussed by Rodrik (2008). In other words, 
publicized industrial policy strategy seems to be embedded in just one side (capitalist side) of 
                                                 
6 http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/sanayi_stratejisi_belgesi_2011_2014.pdf 
 
7 http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1035653&Date=09.01.2011&CategoryID=80   20 
private sector networks, it  ignores labor side, and hence it does not result in optimal 
information flow between the state and private agents.  
Moreover, after reading the document and checking the listed references, we see the 
document has been dominated European Commission (EC) reports and it ignores unorthodox 
literature about industrialization. In fact, in the first clauses of the document, it becomes clear 
that the basic motivation to prepare the document is to close the chapter of “Enterprise and 
Industrial Policy” in Turkey's EU Accession Talks. In other words, it seems that it has been 
prepared with a routine chapter closing motivation not with a genuine aim of industrializing.  
In addition, in the third clause of the document, it has been declared that EU officials 
have evaluated industrial policy implementations in Turkey and approved its consistency with 
EU standards. It should be questioned how a less developed country such as Turkey, with 
different economic, cultural, social and political backgrounds, can develop by implementing 
EU approved nonselective industrial policies. To the  best our knowledge, there is no 
developed country that has prospered by utilizing nonselective industrial policies similar to 
EU approved ones.  
In that respect, designed industrial policy may not have optimum level of “autonomy”. 
It seems it is highly affected by EC regulations and views of their supporters in the domestic 
economy. It does not make us feel the report has been prepared autonomously by the state to 
ensure industrialization of Turkish economy. In sum, we have doubts about whether the 
publicized report satisfies “embedded autonomy” necessary condition of proper industrial 
policy design (Chang, 2006; Rodrik, 2008). Moreover, the report’s action plan to industrialize 
may face opposition from excluded actors in the economy.   
Furthermore, the designed industrial policy does not mention discipline tools (sticks) 
to limit usage of resource inefficiently. There are many things in the form of to do list for the 
state, but it is not clear how the performance of the private sector will be evaluated and which 
actions will be taken for unsuccessful investments. Hence, we think that the report does not 
give enough importance of establishing proper reciprocal control mechanism and monitorable 
performance standards in allocating government funds.  
In that respect, the report does not have well-balanced structure in the form of 
incentives and discipline tools. There are not any explicit goals to be given to private sector   21 
agencies to make them responsible to reach predetermined targets. All these concerns also 
increase our suspicion about unilateral (noninclusive of all socio-economic partners) 
preparation of the report. 
We know that, in addition to those aforementioned main five determinants of 
successes of industrial policy in section 4.b, we see deliberation councils for policy making in 
key industries have also performed important roles in successful East Asian countries. In 
those countries, deliberation councils include government officials, real sector representatives 
and impartial opinion leaders such as eminent journalists and academics. Hence, in addition to 
nonexistence of labor side in the report preparation process, labor side seems not to exist in 
the deliberation council. It is also not clear whether the Turkish report has been prepared by 
considering views of impartial opinion leaders and whether they will exist in the deliberation 
council. 
 In brief, in terms of preparation of the report, and noninclusive nature of deliberation 
council, the report seems to fail to pass two out of three necessary conditions of well-designed 
industrial policy discussed by Rodrik (2008). In other words, the report seems to have been 
prepared in a way not paying sufficient attention to bring all economic actors to the table, 
hence it may not trigger economy wide cooperative, coordinated and sacrificed attitudes to 
industrialize. Moreover, uncertainties about nature (excluding labor side and impartial opinion 
leaders) of deliberation council may harm credibility and acceptability of the strategy in the 
society.   
After discussing report preparation and deliberation council related issues (concerns 
about design of industrial policy), we turn to policy suggestions in the report.  
We have doubt about value added generation capacity of Turkish industry could be 
increased  by  focusing  mainly  on neutral (nonselective) industrial policies. In fact, some 
influential economists on industrial policy literature do not accept a neutral industrial policy 
as a genuine industrial policy; they focus on “selective” industrial policy (Chang, 2006; 
Shafaeddin, 2008). In the words of Chang (2006, p.2) “…classifying every policy that affects 
industrial development as industrial policy is not a useful way to proceed. If we did that, 
virtually every policy could be classified as industrial policy, which would make the concept 
meaningless.”     22 
It is highly skeptical to expect upgrading of productive structure by focusing 
excessively on EC approved policies and views of mainstream economics. We think that 
preference of nonselective industrial policies  needs explanation when we consider 
unsuccessful results of more or less implemented nonselective industrial polices in Turkey 
since 1980 and proved success of selective industrial policies in all today’s industrialized 
countries. We know that all countries in the world have developed with prior selective 
industrial policy and infant industry protection except for Hong Kong (Shafaeddin, 1998).  
We think preference over neutral industrial policies may not trigger transformation of 
productive structure in Turkey. For instance, the report suggests that (as a neutral policy) 
financing conditions and credit availability of SMEs will be improved. But it is not clear how 
private financial sector will extend sufficient amount of long-term credit to finance SMEs’ 
investments. In sum, Turkey needs selective industrial polices that are designed by all socio-
economic actors.  
5.  Conclusion  
Our three decades experience with neoliberal policies clearly demonstrates that 
structural transformation in Turkish economy could not be achieved, traditional agriculture 
and high labor-intensive sector still accounts for large share of employment and need for 
upgrading of productive structure continues.  
Neoliberal orthodoxy assumes a “static” comparative advantage trade theory, and in 
the Turkish case, it has limited the country to upgrade its industrial base. Hence current 
orthodoxy, which directs Turkey to labor intensive (low value added-low income) sectors, 
can’t help Turkey to prosper. Contrary to that, Turkey needs to behave as having an East 
Asian style “dynamic” comparative advantage trade vision. With that perspective, it should 
design overall development goals and support it with selective industrial policies that will 
bring comparative advantage in high value added and high wage income manufacturing 
activities. To increase living standards and improve income distribution, Turkey needs to 
focus  on  high  value  added  and  high  wage  income  manufacturing  activities  (Şenses  and 
Taymaz, 2003).  
To ensure and assist structural transformation, Turkey should envisage using 
emergency tariff increases and performing a decisive role in WTO negotiations. Moreover,   23 
subsidies for agriculture, animal husbandry, and regional development should be used more 
effectively with a long term vision of preventing deruralization and alleviating social tension 
in rural and urban sectors/areas. With a large, unsaturated and dynamic domestic market, 
purposeful, deliberately guided FDI policy should be implemented strategically to bargain 
with multinational companies and to exploit them in a manner that is consistent with the 
country’s long-term developmental perspective. 
  In addition, policymakers should promote industries sufficiently to convince 
enterprises to relocate their production facilities into less developed regions in the country 
with the argument of reducing regional inequalities. For instance, Turkey can implement 
“flying geese pattern” of East and South-East Asian industrial development by utilizing state 
incentives.  
  With regards to monetary policy, industrial development and struggles on export 
structure upgrading should also get benefit from a more supportive exchange rate policy. As 
far as we know, there is no country that could industrialize with an overvalued domestic 
currency. Declining developmental policy space increases importance of appropriate 
monetary and exchange rate policies. 
 Last but not least, Turkey should be ready to consider enlarging “declining” industrial 
policy space by revising Customs Union related constraints on Turkish industrial policy 
design to have full right to say in its industrialization policy.  
We think that new Turkish Industrialization Strategy needs significant revisions if it 
genuinely aims at structural transformation in Turkey.  A fair reading of history makes us sure 
about success of properly implemented selective industrial policies. But, the new strategy in 
its current form with excessive reliance on neutral industrial policies is highly unlikely to 
upgrade Turkish manufacturing and hence Turkey seems to be fighting a losing battle. 
Furthermore, current strategy does not include all socio-economic partners, it does not satisfy 
embedded autonomy and existence of well-balanced incentive and punishment conditions of 
properly designed industrial policy.  
The ultimate aim of any Turkish industrial policy should be production of new 
domestic technology and innovation in selected sectors. Hence, all endeavors and resources 
should be put on those selected sectors. Those  sectors should be high externality   24 
disseminating and high growth potential industries and policymakers should have a long-term 
perspective of gradually having global domestic players in those selected sectors. This process 
should be envisaged as reaching the ultimate objective of becoming an industrialized country. 
Fortunately, relative magnitude of Turkish domestic market is sufficient to succeed structural 
transformation along with domestically produced new technologies (Kepenek, 1989). 
Productivity driven domestic led growth perspective could eliminate risk of “race to bottom” 
and “political pressures” that could exist in export led growth strategy (Unctad, 2010). Hence, 
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